Welfare of cattle at slaughter
In: EFSA journal, Band 18, Heft 11
ISSN: 1831-4732
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In: EFSA journal, Band 18, Heft 11
ISSN: 1831-4732
In: Miteva , A , Papanikolaou , A , Gogin , A , Boklund , A , Bøtner , A , Linden , A , Viltrop , A , Schmidt , C G , Ivanciu , C , Desmecht , D , Korytarova , D , Olsevskis , E , Helyes , G , Wozniakowski , G , Thulke , H H , Roberts , H , Abrahantes , J C , Ståhl , K , Depner , K , González Villeta , L C , Spiridon , M , Ostojic , S , More , S , Vasile , T C , Grigaliuniene , V , Guberti , V , Wallo , R & European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) 2020 , ' Epidemiological analyses of African swine fever in the European Union (November 2018 to October 2019) ' , EFSA Journal , vol. 18 , no. 1 , e05996 . https://doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2020.5996
This report provides an update of the epidemiology of African swine fever (ASF) in the European Union during the period November 2018 to October 2019. In this period, ASF has been confirmed in Slovakia, whereas Czechia became officially ASF-free in March 2019, bringing the number of affected countries in the EU to nine. The report provides a narrative update of the situation in the different countries and an analysis of the temporal and spatial patterns of the disease. There has been no increase in the proportion of seropositive hunted wild boar in the affected areas. In hunted animals, the proportions of wild boar testing polymerase chain reaction-positive and enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay-positive has remained low (< 0.05). In addition to the obvious seasonal peak in summer in domestic pigs, seasonality of ASF in wild boar was statistically confirmed. A network analysis demonstrated that the median velocity of the natural propagation of the disease in wild boar populations was between 2.9 and 11.7 km/year. Human-mediated spread, both in pigs and wild boar, however, remains important. Several wild boar- and domestic pig-related risk factors for ASF occurrence in non-commercial farms in Romania were identified with a case–control study. This report also updates an extensive literature review on control measures to stop the spread of the disease in wild boar and on measures to separate wild boar populations. Several new studies have been identified in this reporting period, but these did not alter the conclusions of the previous reporting period. Field experience with the use of fences as part of the control strategy deployed in the Belgian focal outbreak of ASF in wild boar is described. So far, the measures have proven effective to keep ASF virus inside the affected area. This strategy included a combination of different measures, namely zoning, carcass removal, a complete feeding ban, specific hunting regulations and depopulation actions depending on the zone, a partial ban of people and logging, and setting up a network of concentric fences.
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EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the effectiveness of some of the control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases ('Animal Health Law'). This opinion belongs to a series of opinions where these control measures will be assessed, with this opinion covering the assessment of control measures for glanders. In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts review the effectiveness of: (i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, (ii) monitoring period and (iii) the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zone, and the minimum length of time the measures should be applied in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of opinions has been published elsewhere. Considering the epidemiology and distribution of glanders, it was foreseen that three different situations could lead to a suspicion of the disease. Sampling procedures were defined for each of the three different suspicion types, which can also be applied in most of the other scenarios assessed. The monitoring period (6 months) was assessed as effective in all scenarios. The AHAW Panel of experts considered the minimum radius and duration of the existing protection and surveillance zone, set at the establishment level, effective. Recommendations provided for each of the scenarios assessed aim to support the European Commission in the drafting of further pieces of legislation, as well as for plausible ad hoc requests in relation to glanders. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
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In: EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare , , Nielsen , S S , Alvarez , J , Bicout , D J , Calistri , P , Canali , E , Drewe , J A , Garin-Bastuji , B , Gonzales Rojas , J L , Schmidt , C G , Herskin , M , Michel , V , Miranda Chueca , M Á , Padalino , B , Pasquali , P , Spoolder , H , Ståhl , K , Velarde , A , Viltrop , A , Winckler , C , Gubbins , S , Laroucau , K , Antoniou , S-E , Aznar , I , Broglia , A , Lima , E , Van der Stede , Y , Zancanaro , G & Roberts , H C 2022 , ' Assessment of the control measures of the category A diseases of Animal Health Law: Burkholderia mallei (Glanders) ' , EFSA Journal , vol. 20 , no. 1 , e07069 , pp. 1-60 . https://doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2022.7069
Abstract EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the effectiveness of some of the control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases ('Animal Health Law'). This opinion belongs to a series of opinions where these control measures will be assessed, with this opinion covering the assessment of control measures for glanders. In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts review the effectiveness of: (i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, (ii) monitoring period and (iii) the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zone, and the minimum length of time the measures should be applied in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of opinions has been published elsewhere. Considering the epidemiology and distribution of glanders, it was foreseen that three different situations could lead to a suspicion of the disease. Sampling procedures were defined for each of the three different suspicion types, which can also be applied in most of the other scenarios assessed. The monitoring period (6 months) was assessed as effective in all scenarios. The AHAW Panel of experts considered the minimum radius and duration of the existing protection and surveillance zone, set at the establishment level, effective. Recommendations provided for each of the scenarios assessed aim to support the European Commission in the drafting of further pieces of legislation, as well as for plausible ad hoc requests in relation to glanders.
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In: EFSA journal, Band 20, Heft 1
ISSN: 1831-4732
In: EFSA journal, Band 18, Heft 3
ISSN: 1831-4732
In: Nielsen , S S , Alvarez , J , Bicout , D J , Calistri , P , Depner , K , Drewe , J A , Garin-Bastuji , B , Rojas , J L G , Schmidt , C G , Michel , V , Chueca , M Á M , Roberts , H C , Sihvonen , L H , Stahl , K , Calvo , A V , Viltrop , A , Winckler , C , Bett , B , Cetre-Sossah , C , Chevalier , V , Devos , C , Gubbins , S , Monaco , F , Sotiria-Eleni , A , Broglia , A , Abrahantes , J C , Dhollander , S , Stede , Y V D & Zancanaro , G 2020 , ' Rift Valley Fever – epidemiological update and risk of introduction into Europe ' , EFSA Journal , vol. 18 , no. 3 , e06041 , pp. 1-72 . https://doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2020.6041
Rift Valley fever (RVF) is a vector-borne disease transmitted by a broad spectrum of mosquito species, especially Aedes and Culex genus, to animals (domestic and wild ruminants and camels) and humans. Rift Valley fever is endemic in sub-Saharan Africa and in the Arabian Peninsula, with periodic epidemics characterised by 5–15 years of inter-epizootic periods. In the last two decades, RVF was notified in new African regions (e.g. Sahel), RVF epidemics occurred more frequently and low-level enzootic virus circulation has been demonstrated in livestock in various areas. Recent outbreaks in a French overseas department and some seropositive cases detected in Turkey, Tunisia and Libya raised the attention of the EU for a possible incursion into neighbouring countries. The movement of live animals is the most important pathway for RVF spread from the African endemic areas to North Africa and the Middle East. The movement of infected animals and infected vectors when shipped by flights, containers or road transport is considered as other plausible pathways of introduction into Europe. The overall risk of introduction of RVF into EU through the movement of infected animals is very low in all the EU regions and in all MSs (less than one epidemic every 500 years), given the strict EU animal import policy. The same level of risk of introduction in all the EU regions was estimated also considering the movement of infected vectors, with the highest level for Belgium, Greece, Malta, the Netherlands (one epidemic every 228–700 years), mainly linked to the number of connections by air and sea transports with African RVF infected countries. Although the EU territory does not seem to be directly exposed to an imminent risk of RVFV introduction, the risk of further spread into countries neighbouring the EU and the risks of possible introduction of infected vectors, suggest that EU authorities need to strengthen their surveillance and response capacities, as well as the collaboration with North African and Middle Eastern countries.
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Rift Valley fever (RVF) is a vector‐borne disease transmitted by a broad spectrum of mosquito species, especially Aedes and Culex genus, to animals (domestic and wild ruminants and camels) and humans. Rift Valley fever is endemic in sub‐Saharan Africa and in the Arabian Peninsula, with periodic epidemics characterised by 5–15 years of inter‐epizootic periods. In the last two decades, RVF was notified in new African regions (e.g. Sahel), RVF epidemics occurred more frequently and low‐level enzootic virus circulation has been demonstrated in livestock in various areas. Recent outbreaks in a French overseas department and some seropositive cases detected in Turkey, Tunisia and Libya raised the attention of the EU for a possible incursion into neighbouring countries. The movement of live animals is the most important pathway for RVF spread from the African endemic areas to North Africa and the Middle East. The movement of infected animals and infected vectors when shipped by flights, containers or road transport is considered as other plausible pathways of introduction into Europe. The overall risk of introduction of RVF into EU through the movement of infected animals is very low in all the EU regions and in all MSs (less than one epidemic every 500 years), given the strict EU animal import policy. The same level of risk of introduction in all the EU regions was estimated also considering the movement of infected vectors, with the highest level for Belgium, Greece, Malta, the Netherlands (one epidemic every 228–700 years), mainly linked to the number of connections by air and sea transports with African RVF infected countries. Although the EU territory does not seem to be directly exposed to an imminent risk of RVFV introduction, the risk of further spread into countries neighbouring the EU and the risks of possible introduction of infected vectors, suggest that EU authorities need to strengthen their surveillance and response capacities, as well as the collaboration with North African and Middle Eastern countries.
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In: EFSA journal, Band 21, Heft 5
ISSN: 1831-4732
In: EFSA journal, Band 21, Heft 2
ISSN: 1831-4732
In: EFSA journal, Band 20, Heft 9
ISSN: 1831-4732
EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the effectiveness of some of the control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases ('Animal Health Law'). This opinion belongs to a series of opinions where these control measures will be assessed, with this opinion covering the assessment of control measures for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI). In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts review the effectiveness of: (i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, (ii) monitoring period and (iii) the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zone, and the minimum length of time the measures should be applied in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of opinions has been published elsewhere; nonetheless, specific details of the model used for the assessment of the laboratory sampling procedures for HPAI are presented here. Here, also, the transmission kernels used for the assessment of the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zones are shown. Several scenarios for which these control measures had to be assessed were designed and agreed prior to the start of the assessment. In summary, sampling procedures as described in the diagnostic manual for HPAI were considered efficient for gallinaceous poultry, whereas additional sampling is advised for Anseriformes. The monitoring period was assessed as effective, and it was demonstrated that the surveillance zone comprises 95% of the infections from an affected establishment. Recommendations provided for each of the scenarios assessed aim to support the European Commission in the drafting of further pieces of legislation, as well as for plausible ad hoc requests in relation to HPAI. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
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In: EFSA journal, Band 19, Heft 1
ISSN: 1831-4732